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FROM			ABSTRACT	
Chief of Station, JMWAVE			Enceptific	
Super Operational/GYROSE () Agreed Activities		<u> </u>		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				

REFERENCE: DIR-14742

- 1. INTRODUCTION. As a follow up to reference, Maj. Watlington arrived in Miami on 6 June 1962. After Maj. Watlington had an opportunity to discuss the local situation with Lt. Col. Carlos Causes the local ACSI representative, arrangements were made for a lengthy session on the subject of Agreed Activities. It was agreed that this discussion would take place at 1000 hours on 7 June 1962 at a JEWAVE safehouse facility. This meeting subsequently took place as scheduled and was participated in by Lt. Col. Causes, Maj. Watlington, Dudley R. JENTONS, Charles B. WIESINGER and Andrew K. REUTEMAN. The specific points which were outlined in this discussion are covered in the following paragraph.
- 2. DISCUSSIONS. In the course of the 7 June 1962, conversations with ACSI representatives the following topics worthy of recording were discussed.
 - a. Opa Locka Refugee Referral Procedures. Maj. Watlington made the point that in accordance with the agreements which had been reached between ACSI and KUBARK, local procedures were to be agreed upon in order that ACSI might obtain refugee referrals from Opa Locka which could be used as a basis upon which to mount OB collection operations. Maj. Watlington underscored the point that ACSI had no interest or charter to run other than OB collection operations. At the same time if any of their operations produced intelligence on subject matter other than OB, this intelligence would be reported via existing ACSI reports channels. REUTEMAN indicated that JAWAVE acknowledged the validity of ACSI's mission in the OB field, and we were therefore willing to cooperate fully in this regard. On the other hand, we believed that it was essential that certain

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

cafeguards be built into any Opa Locka referral in order that we could minimize the possibilities for duplication of effort and/or wire crossing. This concept was readily accepted by Maj. Watlington. It did not, however, strike a totally responsive chord in Lt. Col. Causes. This was noted but in order to proceed with preliminary arrangements, REUTEMAN put forth the proposal that ACSI register a list of agent requirements with Opa Locka and that this list could then be used as a basis upon which refugee screenings could be conducted. It was suggested that Col. Kail would be the logical point of reference in Opa Locka through which the referral system could be managed. In "this connection it was pointed out that once Col. Kail identified an individual whom he considered to be primarily of ACSI interest, he could arrange for this individual to be referred to Lt. Col. Causes' covert unit. At the same time Col. Kail would make arrangements to pass to KUBARK representatives at Opa Locka and to Station JMWAVE a copy of the Opa Locka debriefing of the individual who had been referred to ACSI. Upon receipt of this information KUBARK representatives at Opa Locka and at Station JMWAVE would review the referral. If this review revealed that the individual was not of operational interest to JMWAVE and his primary access was not in fields other than OB, no objections would be expressed relative to ACSI retention and full exploitation of the body. Watlington expressed satisfaction with this proposal and stated that he would be prepared to discuss it further once he had an opportunity to personally review the functioning of the Opa Locka center.

b. Antonio *CUESTA Valle. Eorn 13 June 1926. I Lt.Col. Causes asked if we could clarify the current status of our relationship with Cuesta. As this name did not ring a bell with any of the JMWAVE representatives, Lt. Col. Causes was asked for further details. This produced the etatement that ACSI was interested in Cuesta and vanted to use him in an infiltration operation. ACSI had allegedly previously traced Cuesta with Station JMWAVE and had received the reply that KUBARK had been in touch with the individual but had terminated him because he was unreliable. In view of this response Lt. Col. Causes wanted to know whether we would recommend the reuse of Cuesta by ACSI. We responded to this by stating that we would review our files and would forward a written reply to Lt. Col. Causes within the next few days.

C. Laureano *EATISTA Falla. Born 1 May 1935. Lt. Col. Causes asked If we still retained an operational interest in Batista. If we did not ACSI was interested in using this individual in an infiltration operation and as a result wanted JAWAVE's opinion as to Batista's capability and reliability. We advised Lt. Col. Causes that we would check our files and would forward a written reply relative to Eatista within a matter of a few days.

d. Antonio *ORDONEZ Hernandez. Eorn 24 August 1918.

Lt. Col. Causes asked if we were currently in touch with Ordonez. As this name rang a bell with REUTEMAN we read sponded by stating that subject was of interest to use In this connection we indicated we were willing to reexamine our relationship with Ordonez in order to determine his full potential or capability, and if his capability was greater in the OE field than in fields which were of interest to us, we would certainly consider relinquishing our interest.

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Lt. Col. Causes stated that he felt that he had established his equity in Ordonez through the name trace procedure. Despite this, he had found that Ordonez had disappeared from circulation; and, therefore, he assumed that we were debriefing this man.

Third Country Diplomats. REUTEMAN asked the ACSI representatives whether they were currently in touch with any third country diplomats. Maj. Watlington stated that ACSI had previously tried to harness the pu capabilities of the

Coordination of these activities with Kubaka had resulted in ACSI's being denied the use of these facilities. As a result Maj. Watlington stated that at they present time ACSI was not in touch with any third coungry diplomats. On the other hand, ACSI was interested in pursuing the third country diplomatic channel is a means of establishing communications with inside assets. At this point Lt. Col. Causes stated that he was very disappointed at KUBARK's refusal to allow him to use the facilities of the

It was indicated that KUBARK understood I . Col. Causes reaction; however, the KUBARK position was based on sound security principles and could not be altered. The additional explanations which were made relative to the security implications which were inherent in the use of third country diplomats and how misuse could affect long standing government to government or service to service agreements between ODYOKE and free world countries did not make any impact on Lt. Col. Causes. This gentleman was predisposed to interpret KURARK's refusal to allow him to use certain channels as a clear indication that

one-or Kubakk-s primary responsibilities in the Miani area was to restrict and inhibit ACSI operational activity. Once this attitude was identified no further attempts were made to persuade Lt. Col. Causes that our actions had been taken in the best interests of the intelligence community.

Maritime Enfiltration of ACSI Agents. A discussion of those support services which KUEARK might render to ACSI operations revealed that Lt. Col. Causes was still interested in having JAWAVE infiltrate two of his agents into PBRUMEN. In this connection the point was made by ACSI that under optimum circumstances they would prefer that JMWAVE assume responsibility for the agents in the Miami area and then deliver them through a secure mechanism to Mavana. If this were not possible ACSI would reductantly accept infiltration of their agents into any point in PBRUMEN. Lt. Col. Causes was told in very precise terms that JAWAVE would not undertake to infiltrate any of his agents into Havana. On the other hand, we would consider any proposal for the infiltration of selected agents to a beach area in PBRUMEN. The point was made that in this connection Lt. Col. Causes had to understand that our maritime capabilities were limited and we were currently committed to the full exploitation of these assets for at least six weeks in advance. As a result any operational plan which he might submit to us should be keyed to the assumption that approximately six to eight weeks would pass before we could realistically consider the servicing of his request. Lt. Col. Causes agreed to project his operational plans within this frame of reference.

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- g. Documentation. A discussion of the documentation problem relative to agent infiltrations revealed that at the moment ACSI did not have any documentation problems which they felt warranted discussion at this session.
- h. Coordination Forms. The discussion of operational coordination revealed that ACSI was willing for JMWAVE to coordinate locally those operational proposals which might be received from Lt. Col. Causes. Once this coordination was effected and if there were disagreement, then the operation could be referred to the Washington headquarters of both ACSI and JMWAVE. Maj. Watlington stated that the forms for effecting coordination in accordance with procedures which had been agreed upon at Washington would be sent to both JMWAVE and the ACSI unit in Miami in the near future. In view of this Maj. Watlington suggested that we not initiate the coordination mechanism until these forms were on hand circa 1 July 1962.
- W/T Assets. The discussion of the use of W/T facilities in terms of PBRUMEN operations revealed that the Miami ACSI unit did not have any W/T assets in PBRUMEN at this time. On the other hand, Lt. Col. Causes was interested in establishing W/T assets in PBRUMEN. view of This he asked if JMWAVE would continue to assess, polygraph and train those individuals that ACSI thought were suitable W/T candidates. It was indicated that we were certainly prepared to review all appropriate cases and would render whatever support was required. This then resulted in a discussion of whether JMWAVE would be willing to monitor ACSI W/T transmissions from PBRUMEN in those instances where the W/T operator had not been assessed, polygraphed or trained by KUBARK. We indicated that we would be glad to moniter such transmissions if we were told in advance of the date, time and frequencies on which the broadcasts were to be made. This then led to a discussion of whether JMWAVE would be willing to transmit C/W messages for ACSI agents. Here again, we stated that we would favorably consider any requests for C/V transmissions providing that we knew the content of the message, the identity of the agent who was to receive it, and the agent's location and equipment which he might be using. Lt. Col. Causes stated that in view of this discussion we could anticipate that he would be levying requirements on us in the near future for support in the W/T field.
- j. Secret Writing. A discussion of S/W techniques revealed that if a request for the issuance of S/W were received from their Miami representative it would be reviewed, and if ACSI approved the operation KUBARK would be asked to issue a system. If JMWAVE agreed via local coordination that the operation in question required the use of S/W, then this recommendation would be cabled to our Washington Headquarters where coordination would be effected with ACSI. Once this was accomplished, KUBARK Washington would cable to JMWAVE the number of the system which was to be issued. JMWAVE would then issue the system to the ACSI representative in Miami.
- 3. COMMENT. At the conclusion of the above discussion arrangements were made for lunch, but Lt. Col. Causes chose not to participate in the luncheon session. During the luncheon conversation Maj. Watlington indicated that he did not believe that Lt. Col. Causes would cooperate within the spirit of the DCID's. As a result he asked that JMWAVE be extremely patient with ACSI until such time as Lt. Col. Causes retired and could be replaced. Maj. Watlington

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indicated that the retirement was scheduled to take place at the end of September 1962. At the end of the luncheon session arrangements were made for JENTONS to take Maj. Watlington on a tour of Opa Locka. Based on this tour additional discussions were to be held with Maj. Watlington particularly in regard to the development of procedures for referral of agents to ACSI from the Opa Locka flow.

- OPA LOCKA. Maj. Watlington and JENTONS subsequently went out to the interrogation center at Opa Locka. Here they had an interview with Col. Kail, the tenor of which was, on the part of Maj. Watlington, to assure himself that the ACSI representative, Francasi, was having adequate access to operational leads. Col. Kail said that operational leads were shared according to their abilities between the KUBARK representative and the ACSI man. However, there were occasional difficulties in assuring that the men best qualified received the body in question. In addition, he said KUBARK occasionally pulled a man out of the Center without his completing the full treatment which precluded the ACSI representative's getting his hands on someone who might be well qualified for their operations. Maj. Watlington believed that assurance that the ACSI representative got a fair deal might be achieved through a more complete briefing of Col. Trudencio Ulibarri, who is in charge of the preliminary screening so that he would more fully understand what was needed. JENTONS said that this would be a very good idea, but that it would be better if it were a dual briefing with a KUBARK representative being present as well. Maj. Watlington said that he would ask his headquarters for permission to have such a briefing given. Col. Kail expressed his opinion that the assignment of JENTONS to formal liaison with the ACSI representatives would do much to eliminate present difficulties and all present echoed this pious thought.
- 5. AGREEMENT. When JENTONS turned Maj. Watlington over to Lt. Col. Causes after the meeting at Opa Locka, the two ACSI representatives said that they believed that, for the time being, it would be better to continue the system as at present, pending JENTONS' permanent arrival at the beginning of July 1962. As Lt. Col. Causes is obviously skeptical about the outcome, this was agreed to as a stopgap measure.

END OF DISPATCH

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